Voluntary Disclosure by Listed Companies: Theoretical Framework and Strategic Issues

Abstract

In an economic environment where investor confidence depends on transparency, this article explores the fundamental role of voluntary disclosure as a lever for creating value and reducing informational asymmetries. It aims to highlight how this form of disclosure, freely initiated by listed companies, helps to strengthen the credibility of the issuer, optimize its relations with stakeholders and consolidate its legitimacy on the financial markets.

After outlining the development, concept and process of financial communication, the study distinguishes between voluntary communication and mandatory communication, which is governed by regulatory requirements. It then proposes a typology of the main voluntary disclosures. Two theoretical frameworks are used to understand the strategic significance of this approach: signal theory, which analyses the differentiating function of communication in a situation of information asymmetry, and the theory of market efficiency, which emphasises the role of transparency in asset valuation. Finally, the article explores the practical implications of voluntary disclosure, both for the issuing company and for the functioning of the financial market, highlighting its contribution to more transparent and efficient finance.

Classification JEL: D82, G14.

Paper type: Theoretical Research.