The study of the voluntary disclosure of information about intangible capital in the light of agency theory and signal theory

Which determinants for which objectives?

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to theoretically study the determinants of the voluntary disclosure of information on intangible capital by mobilizing the principles of two dominant theories in management; signal theory and agency theory. The study of signal theory has informed us about the motives and reasons why companies communicate about their intangible capital to know if the information published voluntarily can be considered as a signal which can contribute to the reduction of the problem. Information asymmetry. Signal theory believes that if executives do not disclose all the private information they have, investors rate the quality of financial products (stocks, bonds) as mediums. This should encourage managers to report the quality of their entity so that the investor can properly judge the value of the products.

On the other hand, the richness and depth of agency theory have made it possible to identify the determinants of this voluntary disclosure of information about intangible capital. The latter is an essential component for the creation of value within companies in an economic environment that is increasingly intangible and that service activities represent more than 70% of the GDP of economies. The main motivations behind this disclosure are; better valuation of assets and increased investor confidence as well as a better perception of the firm and the main determinants that emerge from our study are: the capital structure, the level of indebtedness, the size and business performance.

JEL Classification : M31, L67

Paper Type: Theoretical Research.